INTRODUCTION
As public awareness and concern about child abuse have increased in recent decades, 1 more and more resources have been directed toward efforts to protect children from dangerous home situations. 2 In the past thirty years, laws have been passed in all fifty states requiring certain professionals to report suspected child abuse and creating state and county agencies to receive and investigate such reports. 3 Since 1960, the number of children reported to child welfare agencies as suspected victims of abuse or neglect has increased dramatically, 4 as has the number of children in foster care. 5 Although most professionals now agree that child abuse and neglect occur in all socioeconomic classes, 6 the vast clearly involves state action in violation of the child's and her parents' rights under the fourteenth amendment, many of the other mistaken judgments committed by child welfare agencies and their social workers result not in a clearly definable action on the part of the agency, but rather in the agency's failure to act. Thus, a child who is seriously injured at the hands of her parents or foster parents may seek to hold the agency liable for its failure to take action to protect her. 1 5 Similarly, a child in foster care who could return home safely if certain protective services were provided to her or her family may seek to hold the agency liable for its failure to provide those services. 1 6 Imposing liability for a state's failure to act under the Constitution, however, poses very serious difficulties.
Judge Posner observed that "the Constitution is a charter of negative rather than positive liberties. The men who wrote the Bill of Rights were not concerned that government might do too little for the people but that it might do too much to them." 17 This view from the Seventh Circuit is gaining wider acceptance among members of the federal bench. Last year in DeS.haney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, i8 the United States Supreme Court adopted this Posnerian stance in response to an attempt to hold a child welfare agency liable under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment for its failure to protect four-year-oldJoshua DeShaney from near fatal abuse by his father. Despite the fact that the agency had been supervising the family for over a year and was aware of the serious risk of abuse faced by the child, the Court held that the cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984) . For an argument that the fourteenth amendment was originally intended to radically alter this negative-liberties orientation of the Constitution by imposing affirmative duties on government, see Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects of Slaughter-House: A Critique of a Negative Rights View of the Constitution, 43 VAND. L. RExV. 409 (1990) .
18 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989).
agency "had no constitutional duty to protect Joshua against his father's violence." 19 This Comment examines the possibilities that remain after the DeShaney decision for imposing affirmative constitutional duties on child welfare agencies. Part I examines the DeShaney opinion itself and argues that most courts are reading the decision too broadly. A careful reading of the text indicates that the decision actually forecloses affirmative governmental duties in a smaller range of cases than most courts seem to have assumed. Part II discusses the implications of DeShaney with regard to actions seeking to impose liability on child welfare agencies for abuse and neglect of children in foster care and argues for an interpretation of the opinion that will foreclose such liability in fewer instances. Part III discusses a number of possible factual situations other than abuse and neglect in foster care, that might escape the DeShaney bar and support a finding of an affirmative duty to protect on the part of child welfare agencies. Part IV considers the potential scope of affirmative constitutional duties beyond a duty of protection that may be imposed on agencies, such as a duty to provide the substantive services necessary to reunite foster children with their natural parents. Finally, Part V briefly discusses the other constitutional arguments left untouched by DeShaney that may also be used to argue for the imposition of affirmative duties on child welfare agencies.
I. THE DESHANEY CASE

A. The Facts
On March 8, 1984, four-year-oldJoshua DeShaney was beaten so severely by his father that half of his brain was destroyed. 2 " As a result, Joshua is now permanently brain-damaged and profoundly retarded and is expected to remain institutionalized for the rest of his life. 2 1 A medical examination indicated that this had not been the first time that Joshua had been seriously injured by his father's blows. 22 Scars of varying ages were found all over his body and a phrased as a limitation on the State's power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security. " 3 l
B. Arguing for a Constitutional Duty: The Special Relationship Theory
It is well-established that the Constitution generally does not impose duties on the State to provide care or protection to its citizens. 32 The DeShaney plaintiffs, however, argued that this case involved a special circumstance in which the state did have a constitutional duty to act by virtue of the "special relationship" that existed between the state and Joshua. The defendants were specifically aware of the particular danger faced by Joshua: they "proclaimed, by word and by deed, [their] intention to protect him against that danger" 3 3 and actually undertook to so protect him. Moreover, the defendants were specifically charged under Wisconsin law with the responsibility of protecting children from abuse. For these reasons, the plaintiffs claimed, the defendants had a special relationship withJoshua, which imposed on them a special constitutional duty of protection toward him which they did not owe to the public at large. 3 4 At the time the case was argued, this special relationship theory had been endorsed by the Third and Fourth Circuits in cases similar to DeShaney. Estate of Bailey v. County of York 3 5 involved a five year REv. 484 (1990) .
31 DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1003. Since the Court found no duty to act, it did not reach a number of other issues implicated by this case, including. the issue of causation, see Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980) ; the "state of mind" on the part of the defendant that is necessary to trigger the protections of the due process clause-i.e. negligence, gross negligence, recklessness, or deliberate indifference, see Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); whether the injuries alleged were a result of a policy or custom of the Department, as required by Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) and its progeny; or whether the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, see Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) . Clearly, any § 1983 action against a child welfare agency for failure to act that escapes the limitations set by DeShaney and establishes a duty to act, will still have to face these hurdles as well as possible eleventh amendment immunity problems in instances in which the child welfare agency is state-run. These additional issues, however, are beyond the scope of this Comment.
12 See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982) ("As a general matter, a state is under no obligation to provide substantive services for those within its border." (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-318 (1980) (no duty to provide abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469 (1977) (no duty to provide medical services)).
33 DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1004.
34 See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 20, at 18-20.
-5 768 F.2d 503 (3d Cir. 1985).
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UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 139:227 old girl who was beaten to death by her mother or mother's paramour while the family was under the supervision of the county child welfare agency. The Third Circuit held that the facts alleged-that the agency was specifically aware of the child's plight and had previously temporarily removed the child from her mother's custody because of suspected abuse-were sufficient to establish a special relationship between the agency and the child, such that the agency could be found constitutionally liable for its failure to protect her. The Third Circuit relied heavily on a recent Fourth Circuit case, Jenson v. Conrad, 36 which had dismissed a similar claim on immunity grounds but suggested in dicta that a special relationship could exist under such facts. 3 7 This concept of a special relationship triggering an affirmative duty to act has been borrowed directly from common law tort doctrine, which shares with constitutional law a sharp distinction between action and inaction. 3 8 Tort law imposes liability on parties for their "misfeasance" or affirmative acts that cause injury to others, but not for their "nonfeasance" or failure to protect or help another person. 39 When, however, a "special relationship" between the parties exists, there is an exception to the rule of no liability for nonfeasance, and the defendant may be held liable for her failure to act in aid of another. (1976) (stating that the due process clause is not a "font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the states"). It is important to note that a § 1983 case like DeShaney involves two intellectually distinct levels at which a tort-like analysis might be employed. Thus the question of whether an official has subjected the plaintiff to a deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution under § 1983 is distinct from the question of whether the official has deprived the plaintiff of life, liberty or property under the due process clause. Tort law concepts maybe imported into either one of these analyses. Still, with an understanding that the common law is not controlling, it is helpful to look to the original common law definition of "special relationship" in analyzing the attempts that have been made to import this theory into constitutional law. Tort law enumerates four basic types of special relationships: 1) that which arises when the defendant acts affirmatively to cause the peril faced by the plaintiff, 2) that which arises when the defendant undertakes to rescue the plaintiff, 3) that dependent upon the status of the parties (e.g. parent-child, landlord-tenant), and 4) that which arises when there is a contract between the parties. 4 6
The plaintiffs in DeShaney argued that a special relationship of the second and/or third types made the defendants liable for their inaction. 47 Thus, the Department of Social Services had a special relationship with Joshua both because it had already undertaken to rescue him through its prior involvement with his family and because of its status as the child protective agency that was monitoring Joshua's situation. 48 While the Supreme Court clearly rejected these proffered definitions of a special relationship, it did not reject altogether a special relationship doctrine for constitutional torts. Indeed, the Court could not have done so without breaking with a well-established line of precedent imposing a constitutional duty on government officials to protect prisoners and the institutionalized mentally disabled. 4 9 I argue that the Supreme Court's analysis in DeShaney essentially limited the special relationship theory as applied to constitutional torts to type one above, in which the peril is caused by the defendant. Thus the Court's holding that the state was under no constitutional duty to protect Joshua was based on its finding that the state had not created the danger that he faced. infant had no fourteenth amendment claim against county and county ambulance drivers for their refusal to drive her to the hospital of her choice); Estate of Gilmore v. Buckley, 787 F.2d 714,720-22 (1st Cir.) (concluding that prison officials and psychiatrist were not constitutionally liable for their failure to protect woman murdered by an inmate released on furlough), cer., denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986 
D. Precedent for a Special Relationship in Constitutional Torts
The duty to those in state custody
Prior to DeShaney, the Supreme Court had already found government officials constitutionally liable for their failure to act in certain circumstances. In Estelle v. Gamble, 5° the Court held that prison officials' failure to provide medical treatment to prisoners could be a constitutional violation actionable under section 1983. Although this decision rested on the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment, the principle was later extended to institutional settings outside of the prison context under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.. Youngberg v. Romeo 51 established an affirmative duty on the part of state officials to provide mentally retarded persons who are involuntarily committed to state institutions with reasonable safety, freedom from unnecessary restraint, and training as is necessary to ensure such safety and freedom.
2
In the language of tort doctrine, these cases stand for the proposition that in certain circumstances a "special relationship" exists between the state and the individual such that the Constitution imposes on the state an affirmative duty to act to provide care and/or protection to the individual. 53 The plaintiffs in DeShaney relied heavily on Estelle and Youngberg in their argument, and the Court in ruling against them was forced to distinguish these cases. Most of the DeShaney opinion, in fact, is devoted to defining the boundaries of Youngberg and Estelle so as to clearly place DeShaney outside those boundaries. It is important to look closely at how the Court made this distinction in order to understand exactly where the contours of the special relationship theory now lie. 50 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 51 457 U.S. 307 (1982) . 52 See id at 324. 5 1 In the constitutional context the term "special relationship" has usually been used only in cases that extend an affirmative duty of protection beyond situations where the individual is in state custody. See, e.g., Estate of Bailey v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503, 510-11 (3rd Cir. 1985) (finding a special relationship between a child welfare agency and a child living at home under agency supervision). The term was not actually used by the Court in Estelle or Youngberg. In the interests of clarity and consistency, however, I use the term in this Comment to refer to any instance in which the due process clause imposes a duty to act on the state, including Youngberg-type cases in which the individual is in state custody.
While the Court in DeShaney clearly rejected the plaintiffs' argument that a special relationship was established by the state's undertaking to rescueJoshua (type two) or by the defendant's status as a child protection agency (type three), 54 a superficial reading of DeShaney suggests that the Court has set up another status-based test for special relationship, asking whether or not the plaintiff is in the custody of the state. 55 Under this reading, the Court simply found that the special relationship established in Youngberg and Estelle need not apply to DeShaney, since the plaintiffs in those cases were in state custody and Joshua DeShaney was not. This is in fact how most lower courts have been reading the decision. 56 I argue, however, that the opinion can be more accurately and usefully read as creating a definition of special relationship of type number one above. 5 7 Where the state has played some role in creating the peril faced by the plaintiff, then a special relationship exists such that the state has a duty to act. Situations where the state has taken an individual into custody fit within this definition but comprise only a subset of all possible special relationships.
The Special Relationship Duty Outside the Custody Context
A state-created-danger theory of special relationship in constitutional torts is not new. An earlier line of lower federal court decisions, originating in the Seventh Circuit, has found a constitutional state duty to act in situations where the state created the danger: 58 If the state puts a man in a position of danger from private persons and then fails to protect him, it will not be heard to say that its role was merely passive; it is as much an active tortfeasor as if it had thrown him into a snake pit. 59 In Byrd v. Brishke, 6° the Seventh Circuit held that police officers could be liable under section 1983 for their failure to protect a person beaten by other police officers in their presence. In White v. Rochford, 61 the court held that police officers, who arrested the guardian of three children for drag racing and then left the children alone in an abandoned automobile along the side of a highway on a cold evening, could be found liable under section 1983 for their failure to protect the children. These decisions have been widely followed in other circuits. 62 They were not mentioned by the Court in DeShaney 63 and apparently survive that decision, even though these cases effectively create a constitutional specialrelationship duty in situations that do not involve a state custodial relationship.
6 4
E. The Text of the Opinion
A textual examination of the DeShaney opinion demonstrates that the Court's analysis actually rested on the state-created-danger definition of special-relationship, rather than a status-based custody test, even though there is language in the opinion which, taken alone, seems to point in the direction of a simple custody test. Citing DeShaney in support of its holding, a recent Ninth Circuit decision clearly follows this line of cases in finding a special relationship in a non-custodial situation in which the state created the danger. See Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 589-90 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that a police officer who arrested driver of car for drunk driving, impounded vehicle, and left female passenger stranded at night in high-crime area where she was raped by a stranger from whom she accepted a ride, had an affirmative duty to protect the passenger because he created the danger she faced); see also Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake, 880 F.2d 348, 355-57 (11th Cir. 1989) (finding that a special relationship existed between plaintiff and town because she was compelled by her position as town clerk to be exposed to inmate work squads); infra note 81.
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UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 139:227 Thus, after discussing Estelle and Youngberg, the Court stated that "[these cases] stand only for the proposition that when the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being." 65 However, in the following sentence the Court further refined its characterization of Estelle and Youngberg, 66 emphasizing not the custodial status of the state's relationship with the individual, but the action taken by the state which placed the individual in a dangerous situation. 67 The rationale for this principle is simple enough: when the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual's liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic human needs ... it transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause. 68 Chief Justice Rehnquis: continued by stating, "[I]t is the state's affirmative act of restraining the individual's freedom to act on his own behalf.., which is the 'deprivation of liberty' triggering the protections of the Due Process Clause ... ."69 Thus, according to Chief Justice Rehnquist, in Youngberg and Estelle, it was the state's act of taking the plaintiff into state custody that set the stage for the ensuing injury. The special relationship analysis in these cases turns not simply on whether the plaintiffs were in state custody, but also on whether the state's act in taking them into custody created the danger. In DeShaney, on the other hand, at least in Chief Justice Rehnquist's eyes, the state "played no part in [the] creation [of the 65 DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1005. 66 For a discussion of these two cases, see supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text. 6 7 It is possible to read Youngbeng as defining a status-based special relationship. In finding a special relationship duty to exist,Justice Powell seemed to emphasize Romeo's status in relation to the state, more than the state's affirmative action in institutionalizing him. See Youngberg 457 U.S. at 317 ("When a person is institutionalized-and wholly dependent on the State[-]... a duty to provide certain services and care does exist"). ChiefJustice Rehnquist, however, as discussed above, cast the decision in a different light.
r' DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1005-06 (emphasis added). Similarly, while the Court observed that "the harms Joshua suffered did not occur while he was in the State's custody," the next sentence indicated that the Court's real concern was whether the state created the danger: "While the State may have been aware of the dangers that Joshua faced in the free world, it played no part in their creation, nor did it do anything to render him any more vulnerable to them." Id. at 1006 (emphasis added). 69 DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1006 (emphasis added).
dangers that Joshua faced]," 70 and thus there was no special relationship.
The state-created-danger test seems to turn, at least partly, on a causal analysis. In order to find an affirmative duty arising from a special relationship, we must be able to point to some affirmative action by the state that is a but-for cause of the injury. 7 1 Thus, Nicholas Romeo would not have been injured but for the fact that the state committed him to Pennhurst, 72 and a prisoner who was denied medical treatment would presumably have had that treatment but for the fact that she was incarcerated by the state. 73 The "snake pit" line of cases also follow this analysis. 74 Thus, in White v. Rochford, 75 the children would not have been left alone on the side of the highway but for the action of the police in arresting their custodian.
6
Moreover, it is clear that the state's danger-creating act must involve some element of involuntary submission by the individual to the state's power or authority. 77 The DeShaney opinion repeatedly emphasized the involuntary nature of the plaintiff's confinement in both Estelle and Youngberg and the fact that the state had acted 70 Id. 7 1 It is important to note that this causation inquiry occurs within the duty analysis and is distinct from the standard causation inquiry that ultimately determines tort liability (i.e., the causation element of the duty-breach-causation-damages analysis). The latter inquiry asks whether the defendant's breach (here the failure to act) was a necessary antecedent condition to a reasonably foreseeable injury. In contrast, the dutycausation inquiry asks whether some previous, non-breaching act (i.e., imprisoning or institutionalizing the plaintiff), was a necessary antecedent condition to the plaintiff's injury. Here the causal chain may be fairly attenuated; the foreseeability requirement is lessened, and intervening causes do not break the causal chain.
72 In DeShaney, the majority found no state action that had even incrementally contributed to the cause ofJoshua's injuries. Instead, the state "placed him in no worse position than that in which he would have been had it not acted at all .... " DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1006. 77 Without this additional criterion, the but-for causation test alone would produce absurd results. For example, it seems unlikely that ChiefJustice Rehnquist meant to argue that since a state's act in issuing an adoption decree is a but-for cause of an adopted child's injuries at the hands of her adoptive parents, the state should owe a special-relationship duty of protection to every adopted child. This involuntariness requirement is not the only way the but-for test could have been effectively limited. Notions of proximate cause might have served the same purpose. See infra notes 134-53 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty of applying the involuntariness requirement).
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UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 139:227 coercively in those cases.. "restrain[ing] an individual's liberty," 78 imposing "limitation ... on his freedom to act on his own behalf," 79 and "hold[ing] him [in custody] against his will." 8 0 Thus, the special relationship test that emerges from DeShaney is not simply whether the plaintiff is in state custody. The test asks whether some affirmative state action, taken without the plaintiffs consent, has sufficiently altered the plaintiffs situation such that it can be said to be a but-for cause of her injury. 81 Certainly, 7 8 DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1005. 79 Id. at 1006. 80 Id. at 1005. 81 A few courts have interpreted DeSlaney in this way to find a special relationship in non-custodial situations in which the state created the danger. In Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake, 880 F.2d 348 (1lth Cir. 1989), a town clerk, who was abducted from the town hall, held hostage and terrorized for three days by prison inmates assigned to a community work squad, sought to hold the town and its officials liable under § 1983 for violation of her due process rights. The Court found that these allegations could support the existence of a special relationship under the standard set forth in DeShaney, because "the defendants did indeed create the dangerous situation of the inmates' presence in the community by establishing the work squad and assigning the inmates to work around the town hall." Id. at 356. In a similar case, Swader v. Virginia, No. 90-1111-N (E.D. Va. July 19, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file), the daughter of a prison employee, who was required as a condition of employment to live on the prison grounds, was brutally raped and murdered by an inmate who was negligently permitted outside the fenced-in area of the prison without the accompaniment of a guard. The court observed that "a central part to the [Supreme] Court's analysis [in DeShaney was] the fact that the State played no part in the creation of the dangers that harmedJoshua, nor did the state do anything to render him more vulnerable to those dangers." Id. at 17. Because in this case, "not only did the State play a part in making [the girl] more vulnerable to the dangers which led to her death, but ... the State actually played a part in the creation of those dangers," the court found a special relationship duty of protection to exist. Id.; see also Bryson v. City of Edmond, 905 F.2d 1386, 1393 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that because police did not create the danger that led to the victims' injuries, they did not owe a special relationship duty to the victims under DeShaney); Ward v. City of SanJose, 737 F. Supp. 1502, 1507 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (concluding that, under DeShaney, police officers can be held liable pursuant to the fourteenth amendment for their failure to protect plaintiff against a danger they created).
Another area in which the federal courts have been willing to impose affirmative constitutional duties on the states is in school desegregation. Although these cases involve equal protection claims, the analysis is similar to that used in due-process special relationship cases. Thus, the Constitution may impose an affirmative duty on states to desegregate public schools, but only in those instances in which some previous affirmative action by the state (in the form of de jure segregation) created the discriminatory situation. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 200 (1973) (stating that "where plaintiffs prove that a current condition of segregated schooling exists within a school district where a dual system was compelled or authorized by statute, the State automatically assumes an affirmative duty 'to effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school system'...." (citation omitted)); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968) (stating that school boards that had operated whenever the plaintiff is involuntarily in state custody, it is easy to show that a special relationship exists, but involuntary custody is not the litmus test. Such cases are only a subset of the special relationship cases that survive the DeShaney opinion, and there can also be non-custodial situations which fit within the special relationship doctrine. 82 
F. Majority Versus Dissent: What Constitutes a "State-Created Danger?"
Under this view of the special relationship standard, the dispute between the majority and dissent in DeShaney appears to be less a disagreement over which test to apply than over how to apply it. In his dissent, Justice Brennan also articulated a state-created-danger standard for special relationships. While Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, characterized the affirmative state action necessary to trigger a special relationship as "restraining the individual's freedom separate black and white school districts were "dearly charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch").
' See White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979); Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1972); cases cited supra note 81; see also infra notes 154-58 and accompanying text. While in DeShaney the Supreme Court deemphasized the role of the state vis-a-vis Joshua's family situation in order to conclude that the state played no role in the creation of the dangers he faced, in another recent opinion involving child abuse but addressing an entirely different legal issue, the Court painted a strikingly different picture of the relationship between the state and a family under the supervision of a child welfare agency. In Baltimore City Dep't of Social Servs. v. Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. 990 (1990) , the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor, held that a mother who retained custody of her child subject to the supervision of the Department of Social Services could not invoke the fifth amendment to avoid revealing her child's whereabouts to the Department of Social Services and the juvenile court.
In reaching this holding, the Court emphasized the role of the state in creating the custodial relationship between Ms. Bouknight and her son. As in DeShaney, Ms. Bouknight's son had been temporarily removed from her custody because of suspected abuse and then returned to her custody under the supervision of the Department of Social Services. Yet, instead of portraying Ms. Bouknight as an autonomous private actor whose custodial relationship with her son was preexistent and not subject to state responsibility or control, which would seem most consistent with the DeShaney opinion's depiction ofJoshua and Randy DeShaney's relationship to the State, this time, the Court viewed Ms. Bouknight's custody of her son as conferred by the state.
Although the facts suggest an incrementally higher degree of state involvement here than in DeShaney, in that the child was initially held in foster care for several months rather than several days and was subsequently adjudicated to be a child in need of supervision by thejuvenile court and therefore subject to court-ordered supervision, the Court's portrayal of the situation suggests a radically different vision of the relationship between the State and families that are subject to supervision by child welfare agencies.
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to act on his own behalf," 8 3 Justice Brennan recognized that such a standard is meaningless in this situation, in which Joshua, a four year-old child, never had the ability to act on his own behalf at all. This standard is equally inadequate to explain Youngberg:
[T]he Court's exclusive attention to State-imposed restraints of "the individual's freedom to act on his own behalf" ... suggests that it was the State that rendered Romeo unable to care for himself, whereas in fact-with an I.Q. of between 8 and 10, and the mental capacity of an 18-month-old child .. . [-] he had been quite incapable of taking care of himself long before the State stepped into his life. Thus, the fact of hospitalization was critical in Youngberg not because it rendered Romeo helpless to help himself, but because it separated him from other sources of aid that, we held, the State was obligated to replace. 8 4
The dissent agreed with the majority that a special relationship exists when the state affirmatively acts without the individual's consent, thereby rendering her more vulnerable and creating the danger she faces. In Youngberg and DeShaney, however, cases in which the individual was never capable of acting on his own behalf, the question whether the state had restrained the individual's freedom to act on his own behalf should have been translated into the question whether the state had cut off other private sources of aid to the individual. 8 5 The dissent further argued that, on the facts of this case, the defendant's actions did actively cut off other sources of aid to Joshua. 86 By establishing the Department of Social Services as the sole agency to which all reports of child abuse are made (by private and public persons), and by according the agency the responsibility to investigate reports and take action to protect children, the state "relieved ordinary citizens and government bodies other than the Department of any sense of obligation to do anything more than report their suspicions of child abuse to DSS. If DSS ignores or dismisses these suspicions, no one will step in to fill the gap." 87 While the majority clearly held that the state did not create the dangers faced byJoshua, such a holding may either have been based on a specific factual conclusion that the state did not, in this instance, cut off any other sources of aid to Joshua, or it may have been based on a broader legal holding that cutting off other sources of aid does not, in any instance, constitute an act sufficiently harmful to meet the state-created-danger standard. Chief Justice Rehnquist's repeated insistence that the state did not "do anything to render [Joshua] any more vulnerable to [the danger]," 8 8 and that "it placed him in no worse position than that in which he would have been had it not acted at all" 8 9 points toward a factual holding that, in this particular situation, the state did not cut off other sources of aid. Such an interpretation leaves open the possibility that the dissent's argument could be adopted in a later case. 90 It is apparent that the special relationship theory endorsed by the Supreme Court in DeShaney does not turn on the question whether the plaintiff is in state custody at the time of her injury. Instead, after DeShaney, a special relationship exists whenever the state acts to create the danger faced by the plaintiff, and the plaintiff is involuntarily subjected to such danger. While the Court in DeShaney rejected the argument that the state's action in cutting off other sources of aid to Joshua established a special relationship with him, that holding may be read as limited to the specific facts of the case. Thus, the opinion does not foreclose the possibility that "cutting off other sources of aid" might establish a special relationship under a different set of facts. 90 While the petitioners did make the argument adopted by the dissent-that the state cut off private sources of aid-they made this argument in the context of a procedural due process claim that the Court explicitly declined to consider. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 20, at 27; see also DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1003 n.2. They did not explicitly argue that the defendant's act in cutting off other sources of aid constituted a state-created danger triggering a special-relationship duty. This argument, however, was extensively argued in the A.C.L.U. Amicus Brief, supra note 38, at 28-34. 9 1 It explained:
Had the State by the affirmative exercise of its power removed Joshua from free society and placed him in a foster home operated by its agents, we might 93 In 1976, two decisions of the Southern District of New York 94 rejected the analogy of foster care to incarceration and found no special relationship duty to exist. "[T]he state's action in taking the child plaintiffs into foster care, whether with an institution or foster parent, is not a deprivation of liberty. The state has merely provided a home for them in substitution for the one the parents failed to provide." 95 Subsequent cases, however, have found a substantive due process duty to protect children in foster care. 96 In 1979, the Southern District of New York held that "[a] child who is in the custody of the state and placed in foster care has have a situation sufficiently analogous to incarceration or institutionalization to give rise to an affirmative duty to protect.... We express no view on the validity of this analogy, however, as it is not before us in the present case. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1006 n.9. 92 791 F.2d 881 (11th Cir. 1986), aff'd in par4 rev'd in part on reh'; 818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1337 (1989) . The Eleventh Circuit found the liberty interest of the foster child analogous to the liberty interest in Youngberg:
The state's action in assuming the responsibility of finding and keeping the child in a safe environment placed an obligation on the state to insure the continuing safety of that environment. The state's failure to meet that obligation, as evidenced by the child's injuries, in the absence of overriding societal interests, constituted a deprivation of liberty under the fourteenth amendment. Taylor, 818 F.2d at 795. a constitutional right to at least humane custodial care." 97 In 1981, the Second Circuit held that the foster care situation was controlled by Estelle, and that the child welfare agency therefore had an affirmative duty to protect the plaintiff from sexual abuse in foster care. 98 Finally, in 1985, the Northern District of Illinois held that under Youngberg, the state had a duty to protect a foster child from attacks by other foster children. 99 The DeShaney opinion leaves the foster child plaintiff with two major problems. First, courts are interpreting DeShaney to create a simple custody test for special relationship. 10 0 This test not only derives from an imprecise reading of the DeShaney opinion, 10 1 but it is also unworkable in practice since it leaves unresolved the ambiguity inherent in the term "custody." Such a test allows the state to argue in virtually all cases that the child is not in its actual custody because the foster parent is a private party over whom the Secondly, DeShaney appears to require the plaintiff to be involuntarily subjected to state action in order for a special relationship to be established. 0 3 The lower courts have interpreted this requirement to mean that when a child's foster-care placement is initially authorized by a "voluntary placement agreement" signed by the parent (as is most often the case 0 4 ), this involuntariness requirement is not met, and there is no special relationship. 1 0 5
A. Problems Presented by the Custody Test
The meaning of the word "custody" varies significantly depending upon the context in which it is used. Asking whether someone is in "custody" in a Miranda case is entirely different from asking whether a child is in "custody" in the context of a domestic relations dispute. "Custody" does not in and of itself clearly designate a specific set of parameters for purposes of a special-relationship test.
The word's meaning i:3 especially ambiguous in the foster care context, in which the rights and responsibilities attendant to custody may be shared among a number of different entities and individuals. 1 0 6 State child welfare agencies retain "legal custody" of foster children in that the court. order permitting the placement of the child in foster care normadly designates the agency as the custodian. 1 07 The state agency mnakes the initial decision to petition the court for placement of the child, along with the subsequent decision 102 This argument may gain additional force when (as is often the case) the state contracts out the provision of foster care to private agencies, which in turn contract with individual foster parents.
103 See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text. 104 Estimates of the proportion of all placements that are "voluntary" vary from 50 to 90 percent. See Mushlin, supra note 9, at 238 n.207. as to where to place the child. 0 The agency also retains control over decisions pertaining to moving the child from one foster home to another, visiting arrangements with parents, and returning the child to her natural parents. 1 0 9
In many instances, the state agency contracts with a private foster care agency, which in turn contracts with the foster parents. 11 0 The private agency decides which foster family will receive the child. The private agency usually employs a social worker who has regular contact with the foster family and exercises some supervisory authority over day-to-day decisions. Her role may overlap substantially with that of the state agency social worker, and the manner in which responsibility is divided between the two agencies may vary significantly from case to case. One or both social workers might be involved in dealing with the child's school, arranging psychological testing and/or treatment, and organizing visits with the natural parents, in addition to a range of other issues relating to the care of the child. Although private agencies are not formally parties to dependency proceedings, their social workers are frequently included in case plan meetings and pre-trial negotiations and may exert substantial influence over decisions made by the state agency and the court as to parental visitation and the ultimate return of the child.
The foster parent, of course, has physical custody and exercises authority over most of the day-to-day details of the child's life. The natural parents, however, retain substantial rights over their children placed in foster care, including at a minimum the right to make major medical decisions, the right to be consulted before the child is moved, and the right to regular visitation. 1 11 Thus, responsibility and decisionmaking authority with regard to a foster child may frequently be shared among three or four different parties. 112 The word "custody" or "custodian," without 108 See Wald, supra note 7, at 631. 109 While these decisions are subject to court approval, many courts with overcrowded dockets frequently rubber-stamp the agency's recommendation.
110 See e.g., 55 PA. CODE § § 3700.1-.73 (1990) (setting guidelines for approval and supervision of individual foster homes by foster family care agencies).
111 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) ("The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because ... they have lost temporary custody of their child to the State."); see also 55 PA. CODE § 3130.68 (1990) (regarding rights of parents to visitation and to be informed before the child is moved); id. § 3130.91 (requiring parent's authorization for nonroutine medical treatment). 112 The situation may also be complicated when a hospital takes temporary custody Stoneking v. Bradford Area School District, 1 3 the court noted that students required by state law to attend public school could be viewed as being in the "functional custody" of the state while at school, such that a special relationship could be held to exist consistent with DeShaney.1 14 The Stoneking court, perhaps anticipating that this finding of functional custody might be regarded by the Supreme Court as too strained a reading of DeShaney, ultimately based its finding of liability on alternative grounds."1 5 In Horton v. Flenory, n 6 the plaintiff was beaten to death by a private club owner who was purportedly questioning the plaintiff about a crime. Since the beating occurred with the knowledge and acquiescence of the police, the court held that the plaintiff was in constructive state custody. n 7
While in these cases the meaning of the word "custody" was broadly interpreted to the benefit of the plaintiffs, the term may just as easily be narrowly construed to the detriment of plaintiffs seeking of a child pending an investigation, as happened in DeShaney. Seesupra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. Pa. July 13, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (noting in dicta that even though participation of children in a state-run day care program is voluntary, "the tender years of preschool children and their inability to defend themselves against adult mistreatment favor imposing the same constitutional duty to provide for their reasonable safety as for institutionalized or incarcerated individuals"); Pagano v. Massapequa Pub. the protection of the state. In Milburn v. Anne Arundel County Department of Social Services, 118 the Fourth Circuit dismissed a claim by a child abused in foster care on the grounds that the foster parent was not a state actor. 1 19 This line of reasoning assumes that "custody," for purposes of special relationship analysis, refers only to the type of physical custody exercised by the foster parent. Assuming that only the foster parents could be said to have "custody" of the child, the court went on to require that the foster parents be state actors in order to be subject to the fourteenth amendment. 120 Milburn involved a child who allegedly suffered repeated serious physical abuse by his foster parents over a period of two years. During that time, the Maryland Department of Social Services, which had placed the child in the foster home, took no action to remove him from the home despite reports of suspected abuse from the hospital. The child sued the foster parents, the two hospitals, the county, the county Department of Social Services, and employees thereof under section 1983, alleging deprivation of his rights under the first, fourth, fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments. 121 In upholding the dismissal of the complaint, the Fourth Circuit said that the Supreme Court's decision in DeShaney was dispositive and that the facts of DeShaney were virtually "indistinguishable" from this case. 122 In the court's view, the child was not in the custody of the state when the injuries occurred, but in the custody of the foster parents, who were private parties in the same sense that Joshua DeShaney's father was a private party. Therefore, just as the state had no obligation to protect Joshua when he was in the custody of his father, it had no duty to protect a child in the custody of private citizens who happened to be foster parents. 23 118 871 F.2d 474 (4th Cir. 1989). 119 See id at 476-79. The court also based its holding that there was no special relationship on the fact that the child was voluntarily placed in foster care. The court summarily resolved the involuntariness issue by observing that the child "was voluntarily placed in the foster home by his natural parents," without any discussion of whether such consent on the part of the parents could fairly be attributed to the child. Id. at 476. This same approach has been taken by every court considering a right to protection claim by a foster child since DeShaney and is discussed in section IlB. These state action cases, discussed at length by the Milburn court, address an issue that is clearly distinct from the issue of a special-relationship duty with which DeShaney deals.
The state action cases ask whether the actions of the defendant can be fairly attributed to the state such that the defendant can be held to have violated the fourteenth amendment, which binds only the conduct of states, not private parties. 26 DeShaney, on the other hand, asked whether the defendant child welfare agency, which was clearly an arm of the state, could be held to have deprived someone of life, liberty or property by its failure to protect that person from the acts of a private party.' 27 The two inquiries are similar in that they both ask when the state should be held responsible for the actions of a private party, but they are doctrinally distinct. In the language of the due process clause, the special-relationship inquiry asks: has the state deprived a person of life, liberty, or property? The state action inquiry asks: was it the state that deprived a person of life, liberty, or property? 128 The Fourth Circuit launched into its state action analysis from a vague reference in the DeShaney opinion to the fact thatJoshua was "in the custody of his natural father, who was in no sense a state actor." Milburn, 871 F.2d at 476 (quoting DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1006) (emphasis added). Yet this sentence in and of itself hardly indicates that the Court's opinion turns on whelherJoshua's father was a state actor in the sense of Burton and Jackson. It is hard to imagine that the DeShaney Court would, in such a cursory manner, import into the special-relationship theory all of the complexity and uncertainty of the state action requirement.
This kind of mistake in legal reasoning has long been recognized:
The tendency to assume that a word which appears in two or more legal rules, and so in connection with more than one purpose, has and should have precisely the same scope in all of them runs all through legal discussions. It has all the tenacity of original sin and must constantly be guarded against.
The Fourth Circuit's discussion of whether the foster parents were state actors was relevant to the plaintiff's claims against the foster parents themselves. 129 Such a state-action inquiry could also be relevant to claims against a county and its department of social services, but only insofar as such claims were made under Monell v. Department of Social Services,' 0 alleging that a policy or custom of the county caused the foster parents to violate the child's rights.' 3 ' To the extent, however, that the plaintiff was proceeding under a DeShaney-type special-relationship theory, to hold the Department of Social Services or its social workers liable for their failure to protect the child from abuse by his foster parents, the question whether the foster parents were state actors was irrelevant. 13 2 Just as the-other patients who attacked plaintiff Nicholas Romeo were clearly not state actors in Youngberg,' 3 3 those who inflicted injury on Charles Milburn need not have been state actors in order for the state to have been held liable for his injury under a special-relationship theory.
Thus, the ambiguity inherent in the term "custody" raises significant problems when attempting to apply such a test to a specific fact situation. Analyzing the state's duty toward foster children through a state-created-danger test for special relationship raises less ambiguity as to meaning and would result in more consistent treatment of foster care cases. Under a state-created-danger test, the analogy to Youngberg and Estelle is fairly straightforward. Just as 129 A claim against the foster parents does not involve a DeShany-type special relationship inquiry because the foster parents are not being sued for their failure to act, but their acts of abuse. Such a claim does, however, involve a state action inquiry since it can be argued that the foster parents are private actors. This issue did not come up in DeShaney because the defendants, the County Department ofSocial Services, and employees thereof, were all clearly state actors. Joshua's father could not be named as a defendant under § 1983 precisely because he was so clearly not a state actor. 130 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) . 131 No such claim was made in Milburn. 112 Thus, it is important to note that there are two possible theories under which a child abused in foster care could attempt to hold a municipality or county liable for her injuries. The first alleges that the county had a duty to act to protect the child from her foster parents by virtue of the special relationship that was formed when the county placed the child in foster care. This theory relies on Youngberg Estelle and footnote nine in DeShaney. The second theory alleges that the foster parents are state actors and that because their actions in abusing the child resulted from some county policy or custom, the county is liable for the child's injuries under Monel.
133 See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 310 (1982) .
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inmate Gamble would not have been unable to obtain medical care but for the state having incarcerated him, and patient Romeo would not have been injured by other patients at Pennhurst but for the state having committed him, a foster child who suffers abuse by her foster parents clearly would not have suffered such abuse but for the state's affirmative act of placing her in the foster home. The second prong of the DeShaney special relationship test, however, that the plaintiff have been involuntarily subjected to state action, raises an additional set of problems for the foster child-plaintiff, which are discussed in the next section.
B. The Involuntariness Requirement as Applied to Children
Whether we read DeShaney to establish a custody test or a statecreated-danger test, the case appears to require that there be some element of involuntary submission by the individual to state power or authority in order to establish a special relationship. Youngberg also included this notion. Justice Powell repeatedly noted throughout that opinion that Romeo had been "involuntarily" committed to the institution, 1 3 4 although there was no discussion as to what the concept of "involuntary" might mean in reference to someone who is severely mentally retarded. Similarly, the "snake-pit" line of cases, establishing a special relationship based on state-created danger, all involve coercive action by the state. 13 5 Determining whether a young child or an infant has consented voluntarily to some action by the state is clearly problematic. Children who are pre-verbal obviously cannot express their consent or nonconsent. Even decisions to place older children are not usually based on the child's opinion. 136 Most courts construing the special relationship theory in the context of foster care translate this question into whether or not the child was "voluntarily placed" in foster care, meaning whether or not the parents signed an agreement consenting to the placement. Parents do act as proxy for their children in making most decisions about their welfare. 16 One study found that 27% of children voluntarily placed in foster care were opposed to the decision and that nearly half of all foster children were too young to understand the reasons why they had been placed in foster care. See A. GRUBER, 
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should therefore view the voluntary placement of a child as a situation in which the state's action has been consented to by both the parent and the child. For several reasons, however, this is a flawed analysis. 1 3 7 First, the Youngberg case itself, which serves as our central model of a special relationship created by involuntary institutionalization, involved a mother who essentially "voluntarily placed" her child in state care. Romeo's mother petitioned the court asking that he be admitted to a state institution for the mentally retarded because she was unable to care for him or control his violence. 1 38 Romeo, at age thirty-three, had the mental capacity of an eighteen-month old child and wa, incapable of consenting on his own behalf. 1 3 9 Therefore, pursuant to state law, a commitment hearing was held, and he was "involuntarily committed" to Pennhurst State Hospital. 140 Thus, Youngberg, on its facts, supports the idea that a placement consented to by a parent can establish a special relationship. 141 Second, parents cannot generally act as a proxy for their children in making decisions that affect the children's constitutional rights, such as the fundamental right to an abortion, 142 the right to procedural due process, 143 or, in certain circumstances, the right to counsel. 144 to hold that in this instance a parent's consent on behalf of her child causes the child to lose constitutional rights she would otherwise possess. Finally, even if consent to placement by the parent were sufficient to vitiate a special relationship, it is not at all clear that a parent's signature on a voluntary placement agreement reliably indicates that the placement was in fact voluntary. Because middleand upper-class parents have the resources to arrange other alternatives for the care of their children in the face of crisis, those who place their children in state-run foster care are usually poor, uneducated, and without the benefit of legal counsel when they sign such agreements. 145 The extent to which such a parent at a time of crisis may be subtly coerced or intimidated by a social worker who, with the authority of the state behind her, confidently pronounces placement to be "in the best interests of the child" is impossible to measure.
Coercion may often take even more overt forms. The social worker may threaten the parent with a longer placement or even permanent removal of the child through court intervention if she does not "cooperate" by signing the agreement. 14 6 Even if the social worker is more honest in explaining to the parent that she will be given a chance to convince a judge that she should be able to keep her child, many parents may consider their chances of winning a court case against a government agency to be slim at best and will try to cut their losses by adopting a conciliatory stance toward the agency. 147 the consent of the child, "voluntary" foster care placement may in fact constitute coercive state action against the parent.
Moreover, voluntary placement agreements are typically valid for only thirty days. 148 In order to keep a child in foster care beyond this initial period, the agency must obtain judicial approval of the agreement. 149 At this point the placement is clearly authorized by the coercive power of the state. Once such an order is entered, the parent may no longer regain custody of her child merely by revoking her consent to placement. Further, while the court orders are frequently entered with the "agreement" of the parents, such an agreement is often the result of a Hobson's choice. It is analogous to a criminal defendant's voluntary plea of guilty. The plea is "a bargain with the [state] for what is seen as the 'least bad' option." 150 Certainly, a prisoner who enters state custody by such a plea is not considered to be voluntarily incarcerated and therefore entitled to fewer constitutional protections.
While most of the courts that have considered the issue so far have found a special relationship to exist between the state and foster children, 15 1 those holdings are on shaky ground. First, given the dominant reading of DeShaney as creating a custody test for a special relationship, many courts will be particularly prone to use an erroneous analysis, similar to that of the Fourth Circuit in Milburn. Second, given the significance accorded to voluntary placement agreements by the courts, relief under this theory is, in practical terms, unavailable to most foster children. A careful analysis of the DeShaney holding, as well as informed consideration of the special situation of children and how voluntary placements really work in practice, however, should lead courts to expand the special relationship doctrine to all children in foster care.
Regarding the first prong of the special relationship test, courts should recognize that simply asking whether or not the plaintiff is in state custody will not yield any clear answers in the foster care context, and additionally that such is not the appropriate test under 148 See Mushlin, supra note 9, at 238 n.209 (citingJoyner v. Dumpson, 712 F.2d 770, 773 (2d Cir. 1983)). . 25, 31-39 (1970) ). " The only post-DeShaney decision so far to find no special relationship has been Milburn v. Anne Arundel County Dep't of Social Servs., 871 F.2d 474 (4th Cir. 1989 ). See supra notes 118-33 and accompanying text. For a discussion of pre-DeShaney foster care cases, see supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
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DeShaney anyway. 15 2 Asking instead whether the state created the danger faced by the foste:r child by its affirmative act of placing her in foster care, in the same sense that the state created the danger faced by the plaintiffs in Estelle and Youngberg by placing them in institutions, leads to a clearer analysis and follows more accurately the Supreme Court's analysis in DeShaney.
Regarding the second prong of the special relationship test-whether the state acted without the plaintiff's consent-courts should consider that the signing of a voluntary placement agreement may not in practice actually signify the consent of the child or the parent. Even if a voluntary placement is in fact voluntary on the part of the parent, Youngberg teaches us that such action by the parent is not enough to vitiate the state's special relationship with the child. 153 Thus, children abused in foster care should in virtually all cases meet the requirements for a special relationship with the state. They have been placed in foster care by the state, almost always without their consent, and but for this placement, injury at the hands of their foster parents would not have occurred.
III. EXTENDING THE RIGHT TO SAFETY BEYOND FOSTER CARE
After DeShaney, it appears that agency supervision in the form of monthly visits by a social worker to the parents' home is not sufficient to create an affirmative duty of protection toward a child, while placing and maintaining a child in foster care may create such a duty. This simple formula does not, however, address the many other situations that may arise in the child-welfare context that fall somewhere in between these two extremes. Agency intervention takes many forms, some of which are more intensive than monthly home visits by a social worker but not as extreme as the removal of the child for placement in foster care. 154 Simply because the minimal intervention in DeShaney was held not to create a special relationship, it does not necessarily follow that other forms of agency intervention, short of placement in foster care, will not rise to the level necessary to create a special relationship.
152 See supra notes 65-82 and accompanying text. 154 See Oren, supra note 1, at 678 (stating that "in child protection work the line between legal custody and noncustodial supervision by the agency can be very artificial").
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The following are all fact patterns that may arise in this gray area between supervision and foster care, and thus present potential due process claims that are not necessarily foreclosed by DeShaney: * The agency allows a parent to visit her child at the foster home. During one of these visits, the parent severely abuses the child.
* A child in foster care is sent home for an overnight visit with her parents, during which they severely abuse her.
* After a child has been in foster care for two years, the agency decides it is safe to send her home to her parents. Shortly after being returned home, she is severely abused. 1 55 * After a child has been in foster care for two years, the agency sends her home but retains legal custody. After being returned home, she is severely abused.
* The agency removes a child from her home and places her temporarily with relatives during which time the agency retains court-authorized supervision (or legal custody) over the child. The child is subsequently severely abused in the relative's home. 1 56 155 See Lord v. Murphy, 561 A.2d 1013, 1018 (Me. 1989) (Clifford, J, concurring) (suggesting that the state's special-relationship duty under due process extends to a child who after one-and-a-halfyears in foster care placement was returned to his mother who then abused him). 1 56 See Hampton v. Motley, 911 F.2d 722 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that children who were removed from their mother's custody and placed with their paternal grandparents and who then suffered abuse at the hands of their grandparents and their father, had a substantive due process claim against the state based on a special relationship). But see Weller v. Dep't of Social Servs., 901 F.2d 387,392 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding no special relationship that would render the state liable for injuries sustained by a child while in the custody of his grandmother or mother with whom the child was placed after being removed from the custody of his father).
These first five hypothetical cases could present the plaintiff with the possibility of avoiding the special relationship issue altogether by arguing that the agency's action (in arranging the visit, returning the child, or placing the child with the relative) directly caused the child's injury. The existence of an intervening cause, in the form of the private party who actually delivered the blows, dearly poses a serious problem to this argument, but the Supreme Court's opinion in Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285 (1980) , suggests that it might not be insurmountable, given the right facts. The plaintiff would also have to be able to assert that the action itself constituted a breach of duty, probably at the level of deliberate indifference, see supra note 31, which would require at a minimum that the agency had substantial reason to suspect the danger of abuse 1990]
260
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 139:227 * As an alternative to placing the children of a mother and father who are mentally retarded in foster care, the agency engages in a program of intensive supervision. Social workers are at the home forty hours per week helping the parents with parenting and homemaking skills. After a year of such supervision, the children are found to have been severely abused. 157 Applying the state-created-danger test to these fact patterns means asking whether the injury would have occurred but for the state's intervention. In the first example, one might be tempted to conclude that if the parent beat the child during the visit, she probably would have done the same had the child been left at home. But what if the parent had never beaten the child before? What if the child was taken away not because of parental abuse but because the parent was homeless and unable to care for the child? What if the parent beat the child because the stress and frustration of not being able to find a home, and being told by judges and social workers that she could not care for her own child, had pushed her to the breaking point? What if she beat the child out of fear and frustration at seeing her own child not respond to her nor obey her and hearing her call a stranger "mommy?" 58 If these are the causes of the parent's dysfunction, it becomes much more difficult to view the state's intrusion into the family as completely unrelated to the injury. At some point along this continuum, the state's before returning the child or arranging the visit.
Even if this direct causation argument is not available, the fact that the chain of causation from agency action to child's injury is shorter in these cases than in DeShaney makes more convincing the plaintiffs argument that the state, by its action, created the danger that the plaintiff faced and thus established a special relationship duty. (Under this line of reasoning, the subsequent inquiries under standard tort analysis then become: first, whether the agency's failure to act was a breach of duty, and second, whether that breach caused the child's injury. See supra note 71.) 157 For a discussion by the Supreme Court of the relationship between the state and a family subject to agency supervision that portrays such a family as being much more actively shaped by state involvement than was the DeShaney family as portrayed by the Court, see Baltimore City Dep't of Social Servs. v. Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. 990 (1990) , discussed supra at note 82.
Clearly, in addition to establishing a duty in each of these hypothetical cases, a plaintiff would also have to show a breach of that duty, presumably by showing at a minimum that the agency had reason to suspect that abuse would occur. See supra note 71. Here the focus is only on duty, as it is throughout this Comment.
158 For discussions of the emotional reactions of parents whose children are placed in foster care, see Carbino, Group Work with Natural Parents in Permanency Planning Soc. WORK WITH GROUPS, Winter 1982, at 7, 12; McAdams, The Parent in the Shadows, 51 CHILD WELFARE 51 (1972).
intervention becomes so substantial that it is no longer possible to simply subtract the state from the equation and honestly say what would have happened without it.
By bringing these "gray area" right-to-protection lawsuits, in which the effect of the agency's intervention on the child's situation is more pronounced than it was in DeShaney, advocates may encourage the courts to consider the continuum that exists between supervision and foster care, and thus prevent the doctrine in this area from evolving into a simplistic bright-line rule that foster care creates a special relationship and supervision does not.
IV. AFFIRMATIVE DUTIES BEYOND ENSURING PHYSICAL SAFETY
When there is a special relationship, do child welfare agencies have any affirmative duties beyond ensuring physical safety? A number of courts have found that the substantive due process cause of action for failure to protect against physical injury extends to emotional injury as well. 159 Perhaps more significantly, however, two courts have recently been willing to extend the special-relationship duty of the state beyond protection to an affirmative duty to assist children in foster care in exercising fundamental constitutional rights such as their right to family integrity and association. 160
A. The Duty to Assist in the Exercise of Constitutional Rights
In Lipscomb v. Simmons, 1 61 three foster children challenged the state of Oregon's foster care funding scheme by which financial assistance was provided only to children who were placed with foster parents who were not related to them. 162 Under this scheme, two of the plaintiffs lived with strangers because their relatives, though willing to care for them, were financially unable to meet the children's needs. 163 The third was in danger of having to leave her aunt and uncle's home because they could not receive foster care payments and thus were unable to provide for her. 164 The Ninth Circuit held that the state had a special-relationship duty toward children in foster care and that this duty encompassed not only an obligation to ensure their safety but also to "assist the children to exercise their constitutional rights. " 165 In this instance, therefore, the state was required to fund foster care placements with relatives so as to enable the children to exercise their "constitutionally protected liberty interest in choosing to live with family members." 16 6
The court relied primarily on prison cases which held that prison officials have an affirmative duty to assist prisoners in the exercise of their right to abortion, 167 the observance of religious dietary laws, 168 and access to the courts. 1 6 9 It concluded that "[t]he State's obligation to ensure that children in its custody are able to exercise their constitutional rights is even greater than its responsibility toward prisoners" since foster children are in the state's custody not because of their own misdeeds but "solely because they were the victims of abuse by others." 170 In Aristotle v. Johnso, 17 1 Judge Williams of the Northern District of Illinois reached a similar conclusion, holding that under the due process clause, the state has an affirmative duty to assist foster children in exercising their right to family association by providing visits with siblings who are separately placed.
While these two cases effected fairly narrow and specific changes in the respective state child welfare systems, the principle articulated, if followed, could lead to much broader claims for services on behalf of foster children and their families. If the state must fund placements with relatives and provide visitation with siblings, it logically follows that its duty to assist foster children in exercising this constitutional right to family association also embraces an obligation to ensure the provision of substantive services (such as housing, daycare, or drug treatment) that are necessary to reunite foster children with their parents.
Three months prior to Lipscomb and Aristotle, such a claim brought by foster children seeking reunification services was rejected by the Northern District of Illinois in B.H. v. Johnson. 172 Several months after Lipscomb and Aristotle, however, another Northern District of Illinois court held that the state's specialrelationship duty toward foster children does require the state to do more than ensure the physical safety of foster children. In this case, Artist M. v. Johnson, 173 the court found a due process obligation on the part of the state to ensure that case workers were promptly assigned to children in foster care.
Such claims for reunification services mirror the mandate of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980,174 which requires states receiving federal money under the Act to make 172 715 F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. Ill. 1989 ). In this case, a class of foster children challenged virtually all aspects of the child welfare system: from abuse and neglect in foster care and the failure to provide services to reunite families, to high caseloads and the agency's failure to react quickly to reports of abuse and neglect. In addition to the substantive due process claim, plaintiffs also made procedural due process claims and federal statutory claims under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § § 620-629, 670-679 (1982 670-679 ( & Supp. V 1987 . Judge Grady did find a special relationship to exist, such that foster children have a substantive due process right to be "free from unreasonable and unnecessary intrusions upon their physical and emotional well-being... and to be provided by the state with adequate food, shelter, clothing and medical care and minimally adequate training to secure these basic constitutional rights," Artist M., 715 F. Supp. at 1396, but was unwilling to extend this right to parental and sibling visitation and reunification services, see id. at 1396-97.
'73 726 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Ill. 1989). While holding that a special-relationship duty did exist, the court nonetheless dismissed the plaintiffs' substantive due process claim, holding that the state's conduct did not rise to the level of "complete indifference to a known significant risk" necessary to trigger the protection of the due process clause. "reasonable efforts" to reunite foster children with their parents by providing appropriate services. 175 Claiming a right to such services directly under the Act may, however, be problematic. A number of courts have held that the Act creates a cause of action only to enforce its procedural aspects (such as the requirement that case plans be written for each foster child and periodically reviewed).' 76 Other courts have also held that damages are not available under the Act. 177 Thus, the substantive due process theory endorsed in Lipscomb, Aristotle, and Artist M. may provide a useful alternative method to force child welfare agencies to comply with their mandate to provide the substantive services necessary to reunite foster children with their families.
B. The Duty to Provide Care and Services Distinguished from the Duty to Protect from Private Violence
A state's duty to protect individuals from private violence can be distinguished from its duty to provide care and services. DeShaney clearly involved the former as do the foster care abuse cases. 178
175 The Act provides, in relevant part:
In order for a State to be eligible for payments under this part, it shall have a plan approved by the Secretary which . .. (15) ... provides that, in each case, reasonable efforts will be made (A) prior to the placement of a child in foster care, to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from his home, and (B) to make it possible for the child to return to his home .... 1182 (N.D. Il1. 1990 ) (holding that the Act's "reasonable efforts" requirement that substantive services be provided to families is enforceable); ArtistM., 726 F. Supp. at 695 (stating that "if private plaintiffs have the right ... to enforce their statutory entitlements to case plans and case reviews, the rights of the plaintiff class here to obtain preventive and reunification services must enjoy the same standing"). 
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Estelle, however, which established a duty to provide medical care, falls in the latter category, as do Lipscomb and Aristotle. Youngberg involved both protection (from the violence of other inmates) and care (adequate food, clothing, and training). Should these two duties be treated the same for purposes of special relationship analysis?
When an individual requests state protection, the harm from which she seeks protection comes from a clearly identifiable source other than the state. The source of Joshua's injuries, for example, was his father. 179 When an individual requests care or services from the state, however, the source of the harm those services will alleviate is more abstract; it may be disease or poverty. To protect the first individual from actions of a third party, the state must inevitably restrain the liberty of the third party in some way. Protecting Joshua DeShaney, for instance, would have required interfering with his father's liberty interest in raising his child. Since such direct and active governmental interference with liberty is exactly what the due process clause most clearly proscribes, courts have reason to be particularly hesitant in imposing such a duty to protect.
Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed this hesitation in DeShaney:
[I]t must also be said that had [the state] moved too soon to take custody of the son away from the father, [it] would likely have been met with charges of improperly intruding into the parentchild relationship, charges based on the same Due Process Clause that forms the basis for the present charge of failure to provide adequate protection. 8 0
Thus, the duty of protection potentially sets two constitutional imperatives against each other: the liberty interest of the child to be free from harm and the liberty interest of the third party to be free from governmental interference. A duty to provide care or services does not present this problem of conflicting constitutional mandates since there is no identifiable source of harm. Provision of medical care to a prisoner or reunification services to a foster child does not require the state to impose restraints on a third party's liberty. This observation suggests that we should be more willing to impose a duty of care on the state than a duty of protection, 181 and that perhaps the special-relationship test should be different in the two instances. Under this analysis, DeShaney is only binding precedent as to the duty of protection, and advocates asserting a duty to provide care or services are free to argue for a broader definition of a special relationship. 182 
V. OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS LEFT OPEN BY DESHANEY
Other than the alternative of suing under state tort law,1 8 3 which Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested would have been the most appropriate recourse for the plaintiffs in DeShaney, the opinion leaves open several other constitutional claims for plaintiffs seeking to impose affirmative duties on child welfare agencies. Depending on the facts involved, children injured as a result of agency inaction may be able to allege violations of their equal protection or procedural due process rights.
First, as the Court pointed out, a plaintiff who is a member of a disfavored minority can make a claim under the equal protection clause that she was selectively denied protective services because of her disfavored status. 184 Additionally, even plaintiffs who are not 181 But see Currie, supra note 4.4, at 875 (observing that the contract clause of the Constitution requires some governmental protection against third parties but not against poverty or disease).
182 Lower courts so far have not made this distinction, but instead have applied DeShaney with full force to substantive due process claims asserting a duty to provide services. See, e.g., Alessi v. Commonwealth of Pa., 893 F.2d 1444, 1448 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding no duty to provide residential treatment services to mentally retarded individuals); Edwards v.Johnston County Health Dep't, 885 F.2d 1215, 1219 (4th Cir. 1989) (finding no duty to ensure safe and sanitary housing); Philadelphia Police & Fire Ass'n for Handicapped Children, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 874 F.2d 156, 166-68 (3d Cir. 1989) (finding no duty to continue providing services to mentally retarded individuals who live at home).
183 Depending on state law, such suits may be barred by sovereign immunity, or the amount of damages may be limited. In Wisconsin, for example, where the DeShaney case arose, damages in state tort suits are limited to $50,000. See WIs. STAT. § 893.80(3) (1983).
'84 See DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1004 n.3. This type of claim has been brought against police departments by adult women who have been victims of domestic violence and allege that the police department's failure to respond to domestic violence calls as quickly as to reports of other types of assaults violates equal protection. See, e.g.,
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members of a suspect class may in some instances be able to argue that they have been subject to arbitrary and capricious governmental action in violation of the equal protection clause. It is well established that governmental action that arbitrarily singles out individuals and treats them less favorably than others similarly situated violates the equal protection clause under the minimum scrutiny of the rational basis standard. 18 5 It is possible that this kind of equal protection argument could be made in a DeShaney-type situation. Admittedly, in most child protection cases such minimum scrutiny would be easy for the state to overcome; if the agency could make any reasonable assertion that the decision to ignore or give less attention to a case was based on a social worker's judgment, the claim would fail. The best factual situation for the assertion of such a claim, therefore, would be one in which the plaintiff's case "fell through the cracks" and was ignored purely because of administrative error, rather than one that received consideration by a social worker. Where it is possible to demonstrate that other similarly situated children have received greater protection and that the source of the disparate treatment is entirely arbitrary, this type of equal protection claim may lie even in the absence of invidious discrimination.
In Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 186 the Supreme Court indicated that this kind of arbitrary administrative action taken pursuant to a facially neutral law could constitute an equal protection violation. That case involved a plaintiff who filed a complaint before the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission. Under the state statute, the Commission had 120 days after the filing of the complaint to convene a fact-finding conference. Because the Commission, through inadvertence, failed to schedule the conference within the specified time limit, the plaintiff's claim was dropped. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff on procedural due process grounds, but a majority of the Court also Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984) . But see McKee v. City of Rockwell, 877 F.2d 409, 413 (5th Cir. 1989) (rejecting plaintiff's claim that the police department's failure to respond to domestic violence calls violated equal protection on the grounds that plaintiffs cannot circumvent DeShaney by converting a due process claim into an equal protection claim), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 727 (1990) .
o See e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74-79 (1972) (holding that the double bond prerequisite for appealing an action under the Oregon Forcible Entry and Detainer Statute violated the equal protection clause under the minimum rationality standard because it granted appeals to some litigants while "arbitrarily" and "capriciously" denying them to others). 186 455 U.S. 422 (1982). 1990] 
